Multicriteria games describe strategic interactions in which players, having more than one criterion to take into account, don't have an a-priori opinion on the rel-ative importance of all these criteria. Roemer (2005) introduces an organizational interpretation of the concept of equilibrium: each player can be viewed as running a bargaining game among criteria. In this paper, we analyze the bargaining problem within each player by considering the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution. We provide existence results for the so called Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution equilibria for a general class of disagreement points which properly includes the one considered in Roemer (2005). Moreover we look at the refinement power of this equilibrium concept and show that it is an effective selection device even when combined with classical refinement concepts based on stability with respect to perturbations such as the the extension to multicriteria games of the Selten's (1975) trembling hand perfect equilibrium concept.
Introduction
Multicriteria games describe strategic interactions in which players' payoff are vectorvalued functions, representing players' multiple goals; in other words, agents, having more than one criterion to take into account, don't have an a-priori opinion on the relative importance of all these criteria. Different extensions of the classical concept of Nash equilibrium have been adopted for multicriteria games; the concepts of weak Pareto-Nash and Pareto-Nash equilibrium, as introduced in Shapley (1959) , play a fundamental role and satisfy existence theorems under classical assumptions. Since in multicriteria games multiplicity of the equilibria arises even more drastically with respect to the standard scalar case, some contributions have also been made to generalize refinement concepts for Nash equilibria to the multicriteria games (see Puerto and Fernandez (1995) or Borm, van Megen and Tijs (1999) for perfect equilibria, Yang and Yu (2002) for essential equilibria).
Another approach is considered in Roemer (2005) where the author shows that, on the one hand, in applications it will often be the case that in a multicriteria game each player is an organization whose members have different goals and where the set of members sharing the same goal is called a faction (organizations might be political parties, firms, or trade unions). On the other hand, each player can be regarded as an organization whose factions are represented by the payoff's components. Therefore he introduces an organizational interpretation of the concept of equilibrium: each player/organization can be viewed as running a bargaining game among criteria/internal factions" in which the disagreement point corresponds to a fixed and exogenously given status quo strategy of the player. In particular, the bargaining problem within each player/organization is solved by considering the weighted Nash bargaining solution (Nash (1950) ) and it has been shown that every Pareto-Nash equilibrium can been regarded as a weighted Nash bargaining solution equilibrium for a suitable choice of the weights. In this paper, we analyze the bargaining problem within each player/organization by considering the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution (Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) ). We provide existence results for the so called Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution equilibria for a general class of disagreement points which properly includes the one considered in Roemer (2005) and the one called minimal expectation disagreement point defined in Roth (1977) . Moreover, since in multicriteria games multiplicity of equilibria arises even more drastically with respect to the standard scalar case, we look at the refinement power of the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution equilibrium and show that, differently from the weighted Nash bargaining solution equilibrium, it is an effective selection device. Finally we show that it is possible to combine the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution equilibrium with the refinements based on trembles; more precisely we consider the extension to multicriteria games of Selten's (1975) trembling hand perfect equilibria as defined in Borm, van Megen and Tijs (1999) . We show that the intersection between Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution equilibria and perfect equilibria is not empty and that it provides a sharper selection device for weak Pareto-Nash equilibria.
Multicriteria Games
Multicriteria games describe interactions in which players' payoff are vector-valued functions; which means that players, having more then one criterion to take into account, don't have an a-priori opinion on the relative importance of all their criteria. In this paper we will consider games of the form:
where I = {1, . . . , n} is the finite players' set; for every player i, the strategy set X i is a subset of R l (i) and the payoff is a vector-valued function
, where
In case the players act non-cooperatively, different extensions of the classical concept of Nash equilibrium have been adopted; however, the concepts of weak Pareto-Nash and Pareto-Nash equilibrium, as introduced in Shapley (1959) , play a fundamental role (see Wang (1993) for more general existence theorems and Morgan (2004) for variational stability, well-posedness and for an extensive list of references). We recall here some classical definitions and notations: Definition 2.1: Given x −i ∈ X −i , the strategy x i ∈ X i is said to be strongly (Pareto) dominated by the strategy
+ . While, the strategy x i ∈ X i is said to be (Pareto) dominated by the strategy
be the set-valued map where
and
Finally, for every player i and for every
and a strategy x i is a Pareto solution for the vector-valued function
3 Gamesà la Kalai-Smorodinsky Roemer (2005) shows that, on the one hand, in many applications players are organizations whose members have different goals and where the set of members of each organization sharing the same goal is called a faction; on the other hand, he points out that each player in a multicriteria game can be regarded as an organization whose factions are represented by the payoff's components. Therefore he introduces an organizational interpretation of the concept of equilibrium by considering a bargaining game among criteria/internal factions in which the disagreement point corresponds to a fixed and exogenously given status quo strategy of the player. In particular, the bargaining problem within each player/organization is solved by considering the weighted Nash bargaining solution (Nash (1951) ) and it has been shown that every Pareto-Nash equilibrium can been regarded as a weighted Nash bargaining solution equilibrium for a suitable choice of the weights.
In this paper, we analyze the bargaining problem within each player/organization by considering the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution (Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) ) for a general class of disagreement points which properly includes the one considered in Roemer (2005) . We consider the case where the vector payoffs have only two components, that is, for every i ∈ I,
, because the properties of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution become different when the dimension is greater or equal than 3 and this case will be considered in another paper.
More precisely, fixed a strategy profile for his opponents x −i , each player/organization faces a bargaining problem (
In order to develop the theory we will use the following: 
The Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution to this problem is constructed as follows: given opponents' profile x −i , let α i (x −i ) be the ideal point of player i given opponents' profile x −i , that is,
) has positive slope so that the partial order given by the 
, then at least one of the previous inequalities is strict, then
, which is a contradiction; hence y ∈ P i (x −i ) and
) and we get a contradiction. Hence y ∈ P i (x −i ) and
Lemma 3.2: In the Assumptions 1 and 2, for every player i and every x
Proof. The ideal point of C i (x −i ) coincides with α i (x −i ), therefore, following the proof of the main Theorem in Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) 
) and the line connecting these points have negative slope; it can be checked that (α
intersects the segment connecting these two points and this intersection belongs to
) has positive slope so that the partial order given by the Pareto dominance relation in R
with at least one of the two inequalities strict, then L(ϕ i (x −i ), x −i ) intersects either the segment connecting z i and (α
In both the cases the intersection dominates K i with respect to Pareto dominance in
From Lemma 3.1 it follows that P i (x −i ) = P i (x −i ) and hence
So, in the Assumptions 1 and 2, the following definition is well posed:
Lemma 3.4: In the Assumptions 1 and 2, for every player i and every
Proof. Suppose there exists
In both the cases the intersection dominates 
The set of all KS-s equilibrium with disagreement point functions ϕ is denoted with K(ϕ).
Leontief Preferences
Now we introduce the game with the Leontief preferences deriving from the bargaining problems
. . , n and we characterize KS-s equilibria in terms of equilibria of this game. For every player i and for every disagreement point function ϕ i , let f i (ϕ i (·), ·) : X → R be the function defined by:
So, we can consider the game between organizations with Leontief preferences and with disagreement point functions ϕ
6 Definition 3.6: A strategy profile x * ∈ X is said to be a bargaining solution equilibrium with Leontief preferences and with disagreement point functions ϕ if it is a Nash equilibrium of the normal form game Γ O (ϕ). That is
Therefore, the following characterization holds:
In the Assumptions 1 and 2, it results that, for every i ∈ I, 
Proof. Fix i ∈ I and let
Assume there exists
, and
From Assumption 2 it follows that α
Conversely, let x satisfy (10) . By definition of KS-s, we have
with at least one of the two inequalities strict. From Assumption 2 it follows α
with at least one of the two inequalities strict, but this is a contradiction since from Lemma 3.4 it follows that
and the assertion follows. 
, is also continuous in X since, in light of the assumptions, α Remark 3.10: From the proof of the previous theorem, the existence result for equilibria in the game with Leontief preferences efined in (8) can be obviously generalized to the case where J i : X → R n with n ≥ 3. While, in order to obtain also the existence of KS-s equilibria in this case, we would need additional conditions; for instance, the generalization of Proposition 3.7 would imply existence of KS-s equilibria when n ≥ 3. 
, we can adapt the definition of KS-s equilibrium. In this case all the results contained in this paper hold true.
Models of disagreement point functions
In this section we analyze some examples by choosing explicit formulas for the disagreement point functions. The first example is the one considered in Roemer (2005) where the disagreement point function of each player i is given by an exogenous strategy of player i called status quo strategy. Then we consider the Roth's (1977) idea of minimal expectation disagreement point and we define two other different models of disagreement point functions.
Status quo strategy
As in Roemer (2005) , for every player i we consider the disagreement point function
where d i is an exogenously given strategy of player i called status quo strategy. Then Definition 4.1: A strategy profile x * ∈ X is said to be a KS-s equilibrium with status quo strategies d if
of player i is obtained replacing ϕ i with δ i in (7) then we consider the game
and as a direct application of Lemma 3.7 we get 
Minimal expectations
In the previous section we constructed the KS-s equilibrium with fixed status quo strategy. However, in some situations the disagreement point is given endogenously; in particular, here we consider the Roth's idea of minimal expectations.
Recall that, for every player i, let W i : X −i R 
. . , n an if, for every player i, there exists a convex cone
K i ⊆ intR 2 − such that J i (X i , x −i ) ⊂ P i (x −i ) + K i ∀x −i ∈ X −i ,(12)i (x −i ) = P i (x −i ) for all x −i ∈ X −i .
Strong minimal expectation
Here we propose a slight modification of the previous model where the minimal expectations are taken over a larger set, that is, the set of all the values of the payoff function of the player, for every given strategy profile of his opponents. It turns out also that in this case the existence is obtained under relaxed assumptions.
For every player and every
If we consider the function µ i :
as the disagreement point function of player i, then Definition 4.8: A strategy profile x * ∈ X is said to be a KS-s equilibrium with strong minimal expectations if
If the payoff function x → f i (µ i (x −i ), x) of player i is obtained replacing ϕ i with µ i in (7) then we consider the game
and, as a direct application of Lemma 3.7, we get (5), then the hypothesis of Theorem 3.9 hold true and hence the game admits at least a KS-s equilibrium with strong minimal expectations.
Stability
In this section we focus on stability of the KS-s equilibrium concept with respect to perturbations on the data. More precisely, given the game Γ, we consider a sequence of perturbed games (Γ ν ) ν∈N with
We investigate conditions of convergence of the data of the game which guarantee the convergence of KS-s equilibria of perturbed games to a KS-s equilibrium of the original game.
Theorem 5.1: Given the multicriteria game Γ and a disagreement point function ϕ satisfying (5), assume that, for every player i: i) (X i,ν ) ν∈N is a sequence of sets converging to X i in the sense of Painlevé-Kuratowski, that is
Lim sup
Lim inf
for every ν ∈ N, such that J i,ν continuously converges to J i , i.e., for every x ∈ X and for every sequence (x ν ) ν∈N converging to x, with x ν ∈ X i,ν for every ν ∈ N, it follows that ν ) ν∈N continuously converges to ϕ i , i. e., for every x −i ∈ X −i and for every sequence (x −i,ν ) ν∈N converging to x −i , with
If x *
ν is a KS-s equilibrium of the game Γ ν with disagreement point function ϕ ν for every ν ∈ N and the sequence (x * ν ) ν∈N converges to x * ∈ X, then x * is a KS-s equilibrium of the game Γ with disagreement point function ϕ.
Proof. We prove the result for equilibria with Leontief preferences and with disagreement point functions ϕ and then the assertion follows from Proposition 3.7.
For every player i and every ν ∈ N, consider the functions α h i,ν : X −i,ν → R, for h = 1, 2, defined by:
continuously converges to the function F h i defined by
Again, in light of the Berge's Theorem, the sequence of functions (
ν is a sequence of KS-s equilibria of Γ ν with disagreement point functions ϕ ν converging to x * , then, for every ν and every player i, it follows that x * i,ν ∈ arg max
Therefore, in light of the Berge's Theorem , it follows that x * i ∈ arg max
is a KS-s equilibrium and the assertion follows.
Perfectness
In this section we refine the KS-s equilibrium concept by considering the perfectness approach in Selten (1975) , in the context of games in mixed strategies with a finite number of pure strategies. Selten's idea is to consider the possibility that agents make mistakes playing their equilibrium strategies. When such mistakes occur, it may happen that equilibria are not stable, therefore, the concept of trembling hand perfect equilibrium for normal form games is defined by a limit process and it is based on the idea that players coordinate their choices on a Nash equilibrium which is stable with respect to mistakes in the choice of their equilibrium strategies. More precisely, if an equilibrium is not perfect then it is unstable with respect to every Selten's perturbation on the strategies. Different interesting contributions have been provided to generalize this solution concepts to the multicriteria case (see Puerto and Fernandez (1995) or Borm, van Megen and Tijs (1999)); in this section we propose to combine perfectness with the game between organizations approach of Roemer. It turns out that not only it is possible to combine the KS-s equilibria with perfect equilibria, but also that this selection device is sharper than perfectness and KS-s equilibrium concept.
Given a n-player finite game Ω = {I; Φ 1 , . . . , Φ n ; H 1 , . . . , H n } where
i } is the (finite) pure strategy set of player i, Φ = i∈I Φ i and H i : Φ → R 2 is the vectorvalued payoff function of player i, then in this section Γ = {I; X 1 , . . . , X n ; J 1 , . . . , J n } denotes the mixed extension of Ω. Therefore, each strategy x i ∈ X i is a vector
is defined by:
We recall the following definition Definition 6.1 (Selten (1975) ): Let Ω be a finite game and Γ its mixed extension. For every player i, let η i : Φ i → ]0, 1[ be a function satisfying
The natural extension to multicriteria games of the trembling hand perfect equilibrium concept (Puerto and Fernandez (1995) or Borm, van Megen and Tijs (1999) ) is the following: Definition 6.2: Let Ω be a finite game and Γ its mixed extension. A weak Pareto-Nash equilibrium x of Γ is a trembling hand perfect equilibrium of Γ if there exist a sequence of perturbed games {(Γ, η ν )} ν∈N and a sequence of strategy profiles {x ν } ν∈N such that:
So, the perfectness approach for KS-s equilibria reads naturally as follows Proof. For every Selten's perturbation η, each set X i,η is compact and contained in the simplex X i . Therefore, given a sequence of perturbations {η ν } ν∈N , it follows that
So, for every player i and for every ν, the disagreement point function from X −i,η ν to R satisfies (iii),a)) in Theorem 5.1, for all ν, and (5). Let {x ν } ν∈N be a sequence of KS-s equilibria with disagreement point functions ϕ for the games (Γ, η ν ); since the sequence is compact then it admits a subsequence converging to x * ∈ X. Then x * is, by definition, perfect KS-s equilibrium of Γ with disagreement point functions ϕ. Proof. Assume x * is a perfect KS-s equilibrium of Γ with disagreement point functions ϕ. Then there exists a sequence {x ν } ν∈N converging to x such that x ν is a KS-s equilibrium of (Γ, η ν ) with disagreement point function ϕ ν , for all ν ∈ N and ii) in Definition 6.3 are satisfied. In light of the definition of the KS-s, x ν is a weak Pareto-Nash equilibrium of (Γ, η ν ) for all ν ∈ N, therefore x is a trembling hand perfect equilibrium of Γ. Moreover, from Theorem 5.1 it also follows that x is a KS-s equilibrium of Γ with disagreement point functions ϕ. Hence the assertion follows.
An example
Now we show with an example that not only KS-s equilibria refine Pareto-Nash equilibria but also that perfect KS-s equilibria refine perfect Pareto-Nash equilibria.
Consider the following two player game. We consider mixed strategies and we denote with p 1 = P rob(T ), p 2 = P rob(M ), 1 − p 1 − p 2 = P rob(B) and q = P rob(L), 1 − q = P rob(R). Denote with X i the set of mixed strategies of player i, i.e.,
Note that, for every q ∈ [0, 1], J 1 (T, q) = (q, 0), J 1 (M, q) = (0, 1 − q) and J 1 (B, q) = (−1, 2q) so for every q ∈ [0, 1] the set J 1 (X 1 , q) of the images of the vector-valued expected payoff of Player 1 is given by the convex hull of the points (q, 0), (0, 1 − q), (−1, 2q). Denote with γ 1 (q) the segment joining J 1 (T, q) to J 1 (M, q), with γ 2 (q) the segment joining J 1 (M, q) to J 1 (B, q) and with γ 3 (q) the segment joining J 1 (T, q) with J 1 (B, q), i.e. Then, the set W P E η of the weak Pareto-Nash equilibria of (Γ, η) is:
Therefore, the set E T of the multicriteria trembling hand perfect equilibria of this game is E
In light of Theorem (6.4) and Proposition (6.6), the set PK(µ) of perfect KS-s equilibria satisfies
Therefore there exists a unique perfect KS-s equilibrium with the disagreement point function defined in (16).
